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F
ew public policy issues have moved from the periphery
to the centre as quickly and decisively as corporate
governance. Virtually every major industrialised economy
and major international organisation has made efforts in recent
years to refine their views on how large industrial corporations
should be organised and governed. Academics in both law and
economics have also intensely focused on corporate governance
[La Porta et al1998]. Despite the growing literature in the field
[see Shleifer and Vishny 1997, for a survey], very little attention
has been focused on the issue of the corporate governance,
especially in banking organisations. As Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) point out in their survey, there has been very little research
done on corporate governance outside the United States, apart
from a few developed countries, such as Japan and Germany.
As has been observed, “despite the general focus on this topic,
very little attention has been paid to the corporate governance
of banks. This is particularly strange in light of the fact that a
significant amount of attention has been paid to the role that banks
themselves play in the governance of other sorts of firms” [Macey
and O’Hara 2003].
The corporate governance of banks in developing economies
is important for several reasons. First, banks have an over-
whelmingly dominant position in developing economy financial
systems, and are extremely important engines of economic growth
[King and Levine 1993 a,b; Levine 1997]. Second, as financial
markets are usually underdeveloped, banks in developing econo-
mies are typically the most important source of finance for the
majority of firms. Third, as well as providing a generally accepted
means of payment, banks in developing countries are usually
the main depository for the economy’s savings. Fourth, many
developing economies have recently liberalised their banking
systems through privatisation/disinvestments and reducing the
role of economic regulation. Consequently, managers of banks
in these economies have obtained greater freedom in how they
run their banks.
As Caprio and Levine (2002) point out, two inter-related
features of financial intermediaries affect corporate governance.
First, banks are more opaque, which intensifies the agency problem.
Due to greater information asymmetries between insiders and
outside investors, in banking, it is (a) more difficult for equity
and debt holders to monitor managers and use incentive contracts;
and, (b) easier for managers and large investors to exploit the
private benefits of control, rather than maximise value. Second,
banks are heavily regulated and this frequently impedes natural
corporate governance mechanisms. For instance, (a) deposit
insurance reduces monitoring by insured depositors, reduces the
desirability of banks to raise capital from large, uninsured credi-
tors with incentives to monitor and increases incentives for
shifting bank assets to more risky investments; and (b) regulatory
restrictions on the concentration of ownership interfere with one
of the main mechanisms for exerting corporate governance around
the world: concentrated ownership.
This paper examines the issue of corporate governance in
banking organisations in the Indian context. The paper seeks to
explore the link between CEO turnover and bank performance.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides an
overview of the relevant literature. Section II describes the
econometric methodology. The data pertaining to the study is
described in Section III. A discussion of the results is contained
in the penultimate section, while the final section gathers the
concluding remarks.
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Literature Overview Literature Overview Literature Overview Literature Overview Literature Overview
A few studies have examined corporate governance in emerg-
ing markets, although none has estimated the link between CEO
turnover and corporate performance, that is the focus of this paper.
Researchers have studied the implications of the concentrated
ownership that is common in many emerging and developed
markets. La Porta et al (1999) study corporate governance
patterns in 27 countries and conclude that “the principal agency
problem in large corporations around the world is that of restrict-
ing expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling
shareholders”.
More recently, the intellectual debate on corporate governance
has come to focus on two different issues. The first concerns
whether corporate governance should focus exclusively on pro-
tecting the interests of equity claimants, on whether corporate
governance should expand its role to deal with the problem of
the other group: the ‘stakeholders’ or non-shareholder constitu-
encies. The second issue of importance to corporate governance
scholars begins with the assumption that corporate governance
concerns itself exclusively with the challenge of protecting equity
claimants and attempts to specify ways in which the corporation
can better safeguard those interests [BCBS 1999].
Some recent studies have attempted to explore the issue of
corporate governance in banking organisations. Boubakri et al
(2003) examine the corporate governance features of newly
privatised firms in Asia and documents how their ownership
structure evolves after privatisation. The results suggest that, on
the one hand, privatisation leads to a significant improvement
in profitability, while, on the other hand, it creates value for
shareholders. Joh (2003) presents evidence on corporate gover-
nance and firm profitability from Korea before the economic
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Table 1: Studies on Corporate Governance in Banking Table 1: Studies on Corporate Governance in Banking Table 1: Studies on Corporate Governance in Banking Table 1: Studies on Corporate Governance in Banking Table 1: Studies on Corporate Governance in Banking
Author/Year Country/ Period Issue
Jalan (2000) India Corporate governance in public versus private banks
Reddy (2001) India Features of corporate governance in Indian banking
Anderson and Campbell (2003) Japanese banks 1985-96 Link between corporate governance and bank president turnover
Adams and Mehran (2003) US banks1986-1999 How corporate governance differs in bank holding companies
Macey and O’Hara (2003) General Issues related to corporate governance in banking
crisis and finds that the weak corporate governance system
offered few obstacles against controlling shareholders expropria-
tion of minority shareholders. In fact, weak corporate governance
systems allowed poorly managed firms to stay in business and
resulted in inefficiency of resource allocation, despite low pro-
fitability over the years. Anderson and Campbell (2003) inves-
tigate corporate governance activity at Japanese banks. The
results indicate that there does not exist any relation between
bank performance and non-routine turnover of bank presidents,
in the pre-crisis (1985-90) period, although there is an observed
significant relationship between turnover and performance in the
post-crisis (1991-96) period.
The role and the need of good corporate governance in India
have been reiterated in several forums [Verghese 2002]. Reddy
(1998) had recommended that the positions of chairman and
managing director in public enterprises1  would be needed to be
vested in one person as against the popular view for the private
sector. This is in order to protect the interests of the organisation.
The major challenge in progressing to good corporate governance
is to build essential knowledge on relevant laws, duties and
responsibilities, financial analysis, strategy, business ethics and
effective decision-making [Reddy 2001]. However, Kohli (2003)
stressed that corporate governance has to be perceived and
understood in a much broader spectrum, encompassing all players
involved in the business, instead of restricting it only to board
and executive management. It is believed that a company having
better corporate governance is quoted at a premium in the bourses
than those with weak corporate governance practices.
As regards the issue of corporate governance in banking
organisation, Jalan (2000) has examined the issue of corporate
governance in public versus private banks and thereafter. Reddy
(2002) has discussed the governance challenges in public sector
banking (Table 1). To quote from Reddy (2002):
Corporate governance in PSBs is important, not only because PSBs
happen to dominate the banking industry, but also because, they
are unlikely to exit from banking business though they may get
transformed. To the extent there is public ownership of PSBs, the
multiple objectives of the government as owner and the complex
principal-agent relationships cannot be wished away. PSBs cannot
be expected to blindly mimic private corporate banks in gover-
nance though general principles are equally valid. Complications
arise when there is a widespread feeling of uncertainty of the
ownership and public ownership is treated as a transitional pheno-
menon. The anticipation or threat of change in ownership has also
some impact on governance, since expected change is not merely
of owner but the very nature of owner. Mixed ownership where
government has controlling interest is an institutional structure
that poses issues of significant difference between one set of
owners who look for commercial return and another who seeks
something more and different, to justify ownership. Furthermore,
the expectations, the reputational risks and the implied even if
not exercised authority in respect of the part-ownership of govern-
ment in the governance of such PSBs should be recognised. In
brief, the issue of corporate governance in PSBs is important and
also complex.
III III III III III
Econometric Methodology Econometric Methodology Econometric Methodology Econometric Methodology Econometric Methodology
Since the focus of the paper is on evaluating corporate gov-
ernance in an emerging country banking market, the focus is on
corporate governance outcomes rather than on corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms. Specifically, we examine the relationship
between turnover of bank chairmen (who we term as chief
executive officer or CEO) and bank performance. Such an
approach, especially in the context of developed country (US,
Germany and Japan) corporates, had been adopted by Kaplan
(1997) and has been, more recently, employed by Gibson (2003).
While examining such a relationship may be a necessary feature
of a corporate governance system, it is by no means a sufficient
condition. Looking at the relationship between CEO turnover and
performance tests whether corporate governance is effective or
not; on its own, it fails to prove how to make it effective.
We estimate a relationship between CEO turnover and cor-
porate performance of the following form:
CEO turnover = f (firm performance, control variables) (1)
In particular, we test whether there exists a negative relationship
between CEO turnover and firm performance. Since CEO turn-
over is a binary variable, we choose to estimate the following
logit regression:
Prob{CEO turnover}=f  (β  firm performance,+γ '  Z)     (2)
where β  captures the relationship of interest, γ  is a k x 1 vector
of coefficients, Z is a k x 1 vector of control variables and f (.)
is the logistic function f(a)=[exp(a)/1+exp(a)]. The model is
estimated using bank-specific fixed effects.
IV IV IV IV IV
Measurement and Data Measurement and Data Measurement and Data Measurement and Data Measurement and Data
The estimation procedure comprises of two sets of results. First,
we estimate the relationship between CEO turnover and perfor-
mance in public sector banking system and in a subsequent stage,
we estimate the relationship for all bank groups (public/old and
new private/foreign).
For the public sector banks, the analysis covers the period 1996
through 2003. The data on names of CEO of individual banks
has been culled out from the audited annual reports of banks.
In several public sector banks, the CEO is better known as the
chairman or the chairman-cum-managing director. In the State
Bank Group, since the chairman of State Bank of India is necessarily
the chairman of its associate banks, the top post in that organisation,
apart from the chairman, is that of the managing director, whom
we identify as the CEO in that bank. There are several data
constraints we need to reckon with in this case. First, not much
is known about the CEO apart from his/her name. There is also
paucity of consistent data on characteristics that will affect the
probability of CEO turnover such as the age and tenure at the
firm. It is plausible to argue that these CEO characteristics are
uncorrelated with firm performance. In that case, their absence
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix of the Variables Table 2: Correlation Matrix of the Variables Table 2: Correlation Matrix of the Variables Table 2: Correlation Matrix of the Variables Table 2: Correlation Matrix of the Variables
Variable DEPVAR RoA SIZE CRAR GNPA GDPGR
DEPVAR 1.000
RoA -0.084 1.000
SIZE -0.024 0.145 1.000
CRAR -0.106 -0.722 -0.138 1.000
NPL 0.096 0.789 0.204 -0.703 1.000
GDPGR -0.070 -0.092 -0.224 0.206 -0.192 1.000
DEPVAR is the dependent variable.
Table 3: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model Table 3: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model Table 3: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model Table 3: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model Table 3: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model
Variable Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Constant 3.995  (0.35) 2.881 (0.49)
Performance Measure
RoA 0.017 (0.77) —
Lagged RoA -0.064 (0.05) —
EARN — -0.0002 (0.15)
Lagged EARN — -0.099 (0.06)
Control Variables
SIZE -0.226 (0.06) -0.089 (0.07)
NPL 0.006 (0.52) 0.002 (0.86)
CRAR -0.005 (0.02) -0.006 (0.03)
GDPGR -0.169 (0.31) -0.166 (0.32)
Year dummies Included Included
to find any effect of firm performance on CEO turnover, but will
not bias the coefficient on firm performance. Second, we do not
also know whether in case of departure of the CEO, it was
voluntary or otherwise. Obviously, the link between forced CEO
turnover and firm performance is what is relevant to the effec-
tiveness of a corporate governance system, the topic addressed
by the paper. To control for this possibility, we introduce year
dummies: the identifying assumption being firm performance
affected the probability of forced turnover, while year dummies
affected the probability of unforced turnover. Third, in several
cases, the CEO of one bank might have gone on to later become
the CEO of another bank. Our conjecture is that the measures
of firm performance included would, along with the year dum-
mies, pick up some of these effects.
We use return on assets (RoA), calculated as net profit to total
asset, as the measure of firm performance as it is the most
encompassing measure. To account for the fact whether previous
year’s performance affects CEO turnover, we also use the change
in RoA calculated as RoA minus the previous year’s RoA
[Anderson and Campbell, 2003]. As per our hypothesis, the
coefficient on RoA should be negatively related with CEO turnover.
We also alternately employ operating profits (EARN) as a measure
of performance.
We employ several controls to account for bank-specific features.
First, we employ natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) to
ascertain the fact whether turnover is higher in bigger banks or
otherwise. Second, we employ the capital adequacy ratio (CRAR)
to examine whether better-capitalised banks exhibit lower CEO
turnover. The ‘gamble for resurrection’ strategy would suggest
that inadequately capitalised banks would tend to have a riskier
loan portfolio in order to shore up their capital levels, which is
likely to lead to lower profitability and consequently, higher
turnover. The non-performing loan ratio (NPL), defined as the
ratio of gross non-performing loans to gross advances is also
included as an explanatory variable to capture the efficacy of
credit risk management at the bank. To the extent that the bank
had poor credit risk management techniques, this would reflect
adversely on CEO performance and possibly result in higher
turnover. Finally, to control for the economic environment, we
employ the real GDP growth rate (GDPGR), but do not conjecture
any sign on this variable and instead, leave the same to be
econometrically determined. Finally, as mentioned earlier, year
dummies have been included to capture any time-specific effects.
V V V V V
Results and Discussion Results and Discussion Results and Discussion Results and Discussion Results and Discussion
Summary statistics for the variables are presented in Table 2.
It is observed that, among bank-specific variables, there exists
a negative correlation between the dependent variable and per-
formance (as measured by RoA), suggesting CEO turnover is
lower in banks with better performance. It is also observed that
bigger banks as well as those with higher non-performing loans
have lower CEO turnover.
The result of the empirical exercise is provided in Table 3.
Two sets of results are presented: the first with RoA as a measure
of bank performance and the other, with operating profits as a
measure of bank performance.
Three salient features of the results deserve a mention. Ir-
respective of whether which measure of bank performance is
considered, lagged value of the performance measure has a
significant influence on CEO turnover. In other words, bank
performance does impinge upon CEO turnover. Second, SIZE
is observed to negatively and significantly impact CEO turnover,
suggesting that bigger banks tend to have lower probability of
rotation of CEOs. It might well be possible that, only with the
passage of time, CEOs tend to become fully conversant with the
functioning of bigger banks, this would suggest that CEOs in
bigger banks tend to get a longer tenure to cover for the lock-
in period to become fully conversant with the bank’s operations.
Third, capital is observed to have a significant influence on CEO
turnover: inadequate capital position being associated with higher
CEO turnover. Better-capitalised banks are perceived as safer;
lower capital, as a consequence, reflects inadequately on CEO
performance, thereby possibly engendering higher turnover.
An interesting question of importance is whether performance
of CEO is, in any way, impacted by the fact whether a bank is
listed or otherwise. Towards this end, we construct a variable
(LISTING), which assumes value 1 for the year (and all sub-
sequent years) in which a bank has made an equity offering, and
zero, otherwise. The revised set of estimation results, with RoA
as measure of bank performance, is presented in Table 4.
While most variables which were significant earlier retain their
significance at conventional levels and with the same signs as
earlier, it is observed that when RoA is employed as a measure
of performance, LISTING appears with a negative sign and turns
out to be at the border of significance. Since listing a bank is
associated with strengthening the bank’s internal control mecha-
nisms and its corporate governance characteristics, this would
suggest that having a public sector bank listed on the stock
exchange tends to be associated with lower CEO turnover.
Having obtained these results, we proceed to examine how the
results differ across bank groups. In order to obtain a balanced
panel dataset, the subsequent analysis encompasses 62 banks (27
public sector banks, 10 foreign banks, eight new private banks
and 17 old private banks). The revised set of estimation results
is presented in Table 5.
Several features of the results deserve a mention. First, most
variables which were significant in the earlier case retain their
significance in this case as well. Thus, lagged performance
measures are significant in almost all cases, except foreign banks
for whom contemporaneous performance measure is found to
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Table 5: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model  Table 5: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model  Table 5: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model  Table 5: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model  Table 5: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Groupwise Results Groupwise Results Groupwise Results Groupwise Results Groupwise Results
Variable Public Sector Old Private New Private Foreign
Banks Banks Banks Banks
Constant 2.616  (0.26) 2.235 (0.42) — —
Performance Measure
RoA 0.016 (0.84) 0.021 (0.63) 0.014 (0.66) -0.019 (0.03)
Lagged RoA -0.031 (0.04) -0.019 (0.08) -0.046 (0.06) -0.011 (0.11)
Control Variables
SIZE -0.015 (0.06) -0.014 (0.11) -0.018 (0.14) -0.009 (0.12)
GNPA 0.006 (0.14) 0.002 (0.10) 0.011 (0.16) 0.013 (0.11)
CRAR -0.006 (0.03) -0.005 (0.05) -0.010 (0.14) 0.012 (0.15)
GDPGR -0.174 (0.31) -0.169 (0.26) -0.191 (0.33) -0.147 (0.29)
Year dummies Included Included Included Included
Figures in brackets indicate p-values.
private banks, non-performing loans seem to influence CEO
turnover. Since the credit risk management skills in this bank
group is, more often than not, relatively less adequate than the
new private/public or even foreign counterparts, it seems that
the asset quality of these banks is important in determining CEO
turnover. Third, while capital adequacy matters for public sector
and old private banks, it seems to have limited influence in case
of new private and foreign bank groups. Since foreign banks have
the backing of their host country parents and new private banks
have to perforce satisfy stipulated capital adequacy requirements
since their inception, this variable does not play an important
role in influencing CEO turnover. Finally, SIZE matters only
in case of public sector banks, possibly implying that CEO
turnover is sensitive to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ effect. All in all, the
results can be stated to be relatively robust and suggest that bank
performance has a bearing on CEO turnover.
VI VI VI VI VI
Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks
The paper has studied corporate governance in emerging markets
by examining Indian banking systems in India. In a sample of
27 public sector banks in India, CEOs of poorly performing banks
are likely to face higher turnover than CEOs of well-performing
ones. Along this dimension, corporate governance is effective.
Measures of performance based on return on assets have the
strongest association with CEO turnover, while listed firms have
a weaker association. Similar results are obtained when the
sample is extended to encompass the entire banking system,
include a sample of foreign/new private and old private banks.
It is important to keep in mind that these findings do not imply
that corporate governance in Indian banks is perfect. Indeed, the
results presented may contain seeds of concern for the future of
emerging market corporate governance. The importance of earning-
based measures of corporate governance is broadly in consonance
with what Kaplan (1997) observed for Japanese banks. As emerging
markets like India continue to grow and become more integrated
with the global economy, more research will be needed to examine
if their corporate governance systems also mature.
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Note Note Note Note Note
[The views expressed in the paper are the personal views of the authors.]
1 Public enterprises comprise listed and unlisted government enterprises, the
central and state level corporations, public sector, banks, insurance and
financial institutions, cooperatives and department undertakings.
Table 4: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model with Table 4: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model with Table 4: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model with Table 4: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model with Table 4: CEO Turnover and Performance – Logistic Model with
Listing as Additional Explanatory Variable Listing as Additional Explanatory Variable Listing as Additional Explanatory Variable Listing as Additional Explanatory Variable Listing as Additional Explanatory Variable
Variable Coefficient (p-value)
Constant 3.669  (0.39)
Performance Measure
RoA 0.011 (0.84)
Lagged RoA -0.063 (0.05)
Op PROF —








Figures in brackets indicate p-values.
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